University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan: Autonomy and Shared Governance after New Public Management Reforms

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<Abstract>
Comparing and contrasting reforms of governance arrangements in higher education systems in Europe (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands provide two very different examples) with those in Japan, the paper focuses on the consequences of state-level governance reform for shared governance in the university. It gives a systematic comparison based on the ‘autonomy scorecard’ and applies notions from the ‘governance equalizer.’

The paper considers major New Public Management (NPM) governance reforms in the three countries. It shows that universities remain mostly autonomous in the UK, while ‘post-NPM’ mixed governance predominates in Japan and the Netherlands, with each country affecting institutional autonomy differently. In all cases, institutional autonomy increased in some respects and diminished in others. Concise comparisons are made for four dimensions (organisation, finance, staffing and education) and per underlying indicator. Executive heads’ (Presidents’) appointments and quality control over education are taken as strategically important indicators for shared governance within institutions. Managerial and external guidance grew more strongly in the two European countries than in Japan, though academic self-governance declined in all three.

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1. Rationale and Aim of Paper

Knowledge is higher education’s core business: ‘However broadly or narrowly we define it, knowledge is the material. Research and teaching are the main technologies’ (Clark 1983: 12). The increased demands on universities\textsuperscript{1} due to the rise of the knowledge society since the late 20th century threaten to lead to ‘mission stretch’ (Enders and de Boer 2009) beyond ‘research and training’ and many have argued that for universities to play their enhanced role well, they must become more responsive, more autonomous, and more flexible. Governance relations between national authorities and public universities, but also within universities, needed adapting to enable universities to do so, politicians and critics argued. Such arguments, applying to the whole public sector at the end of the 20th century, became known as ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). From its invention in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, NPM soon became a model around the world (Meyer 2000). In this short article, I analyse how NPM affected shared governance in higher education in three countries.

1.1 Governance Concepts

*Governance* is defined as ‘a set of general postures, assumptions and guidelines that appear to be followed when a government, without necessarily excluding other stakeholders,… steers the decisions and actions of specific societal actors according to the objectives the government has set and by using instruments the government has at its disposal’ (F. van Vught and de Boer 2015: 38). A governance perspective ‘provides a general analytical framework for studying all kinds of coordination problems among actors’ (de Boer, Enders, and Schimank 2010: 138). Governance encounters specific issues in higher education for two interlinked reasons. First, the principal (ministry at system level, or leadership within institutions) cannot know in detail what makes good ‘products,’ as education and research are credence goods, whose contribution to the principal’s utility cannot be fully known even afterwards (Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). Secondly, the ‘production
function’ of education and research relies on professionals (teachers and researchers), hence the process is largely under professional control of those professionals, leading to ‘bottom-heavy,’ fragmented organisations (Mintzberg 1979). For the principal, steering such agents is highly uncertain, involving many partially independent, loosely-coupled agents. From the agent’s point of view, collaboration with colleagues is necessary (professors cannot run whole degree programmes singly, and often cannot do a research project alone) and to provide common resources (funding!) as well as coordination, a principal is needed. In sum, there is mutual, asymmetrical dependence between principal and agent, as well as among agents.

The reasoning above implies a chain of principal - agent relations in higher education: state - university (leadership) - teachers/researchers. With each step, uncertainty about control is multiplied. The amount of options open to an agent under the control of the principal may be called autonomy. In higher education, procedural and substantive autonomy are distinguished (Berdahl 1990). The former concerns procedures and conditions for operation (organisation, quality assurance, funding, etc.), the how. The latter concerns ‘the power of the university … to determine its own goals and programmes - if you will, the what of academe.’ Berdahl adds: ‘Governmental actions that affect substantive goals affect the heart of academe.’ Consequently, substantive governance affects teachers and researchers directly, while procedural governance affects the university through its leadership (Figure 1).

![Diagram: Governance and Autonomy in Higher Education](Image)

**Figure 1** Governance and Autonomy in Higher Education
In briefest summary, autonomy is about ‘who decides what?’ Ever since higher education studies emerged, this has been a question of interest. Clark (1983) invented the triangle of hierarchical state coordination, academic collegial decision making and price-regulated market coordination to show that in every country a balance was reached among hierarchy, market and the peculiarly academic coordination of collegial decisions among peers. In an updated and more detailed analysis, de Boer et al. (2010) distinguished five coordination mechanisms in their ‘governance equalizer’: state regulation, stakeholder guidance, managerial self-regulation, academic self-regulation and competition. They added new stakeholders (intermediary bodies, employers), showed more clearly than Clark that actors and coordination mechanisms do not coincide (the state uses hierarchy and competition; external stakeholders use competition but also normative guidance) and made the multi-level nature of governance explicit (distinguishing state hierarchy from institutional managers’ hierarchy). Moreover, they emphasised that in any system at any moment, each coordination mechanism could be present at different levels of intensity, thus distinguishing low-governance from high-governance balances.

1.2 Method

To compare European developments most effectively with Japan’s, my analysis will be more focused than the ‘governance equalizer.’ First, at the system level, my analysis is largely limited to changes in state regulation and its complement of institutional autonomy. Government’s regulation affects the power of stakeholder guidance and it also largely defines to what extent competition plays a role. Second, I analyse consequences of system-level reform for governance within the university. What happens to shared governance, i.e. the balance between managerial and academic self-governance inside the university? Simultaneously, my analysis is more refined than the governance equalizer and takes the distinction between procedural and substantive autonomy further, by applying the multi-dimensional methodology of the ‘autonomy scorecard.’

The autonomy scorecard’s designers emphasise that ‘Institutional
autonomy cannot be measured objectively’ (Estermann, Nokkala, and Steinel 2011: 18) and they developed a set of indicators to make expert judgments comparable. They performed an exercise in 2010, updated with a second round in 2016,\(^3\) mapping institutional autonomy in 29 higher education systems across Europe,\(^4\) with the aid of the European University Association (EUA) and national rectors’ conferences. Especially regarding procedural autonomy, the scorecard is detailed (www.university-autonomy.eu, Estermann et al. 2011, Pruvot and Estermann 2017), it shows what autonomy universities have regarding finance, organisation and personnel (19 indicators). Regarding substantive autonomy, it contains 9 indicators about education (none for research). Through questionnaires and interviews with the national rectors’ conferences, the universities’ autonomy in the higher education system was mapped. Mapping for Japan is tentatively done by this article’s author, after consultation with several Japanese higher education specialists from universities and national organisations. For the governance equalizer, comparable information was collected on two issues of strategic importance for the institution: appointment and authority of leadership (a procedural matter that determines much of the internal balance), and quality control of education (a substantive issue affecting teachers and administrators). Regrettably, similar comparable information on the other main substantive issue, research, was not available. These two issues constitute complex, qualitative pointers. Concerning Japan, this paper is limited to national universities. They are most affected by governance reform. Besides, although private universities supply most undergraduate education (around 75%), national universities dominate post-graduate education and research. Moreover, this limitation mirrors the available European data: there, the autonomy scorecard is limited to public doctoral-granting universities, too. Limitations due to the instruments used include that particularly the autonomy scorecard centres largely on legal options rather than practices. For instance, it hardly captures the negotiated state control of universities’ strategic plans and performances through Mid-Term Plans in Japan (Huang 2006). The governance equalizer is more flexible, but is less
articulated operationally.

2. Government—University Relations: Areas of Autonomy

2.1 Selection of Countries

To compare with governance developments in Japan, two European countries are selected that introduced managerially-oriented governance reforms early, i.e. where experience has accumulated. The United Kingdom was the first European country that applied NPM to higher education, from 1979 on. The Netherlands was among the first countries on the Continent to follow NPM examples from the USA and UK, though interpreted through the perspective of its own, more governmental yet also more network-style governance traditions (Enders and Westerheijden 2014). Empirically, the UK proves to be the country with the highest degree of institutional autonomy, while the Netherlands provide an example of the mixed situation on the European continent.

2.2 The United Kingdom

Unlike other European countries, universities in the UK were highly autonomous before the 1980s, e.g. with the University Grants Committee (UGC) distributing funds, buffering universities from political steering through academic self-governance. NPM in the UK meant an increase of state control (Berdahl 1990, de Boer et al. 2010). The government increased inter-university competition by opening the system completely to polytechnics, especially to let them compete on equal footing with established universities for research funds. However, the distribution of research funds became much more competitive by concentrating it increasingly on top-rated research groups, and few polytechnics made serious inroads on old-university dominance of research funds - in fact even many universities lost out (Leisyte and Westerheijden 2014). Quality assurance of education has been subject to many, sometimes contested, changes over the years, but seems to have settled on recognition of it being the responsibility of universities, while a governmental agency evaluates how they discharge their responsibility through institutional
University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan audits.

In a radical reduction of teaching grants from the government, universities were allowed to increase their tuition fees in 2012, though with a maximum of £9,000 per annum - more or less at a full-cost level. This replaced quasi-markets experimented in the 1980s, e.g. with institutions bidding for government funding for certain numbers of student places.

Universities retained their previous autonomy regarding staffing, salaries and ownership of buildings.

Expanding from these few highlights, in the European comparison, on the autonomy scorecard website the British universities come in ‘the “high” group … in all four areas of institutional autonomy’ (Figure 2; data in Annex).

source: www.university-autonomy.eu

Figure 2  UK’s Autonomy Scorecard
2.3 The Netherlands

After strong government interventions in the early 1980s, the seminal policy paper ‘Higher Education: Autonomy and Quality’ inaugurated less ex ante control of institutions, and block grants, in exchange for ex post evaluations giving accountability for quality of performances (education and research). Evaluations of university education were first inspired by the network governance usual in the country with the associations of the collective institutions acting as buffer bodies between state and universities by coordinating the process. Concerning education, evaluation turned into programme accreditation and became more state-controlled to conform to European compatibility requirements since the 1999 Bologna Declaration.

The ‘philosophy’ of governmental ‘steering at a distance’ inspired national higher education policies ever since (Westerheijden, de Boer, and Enders 2009). Concerted development with national development plans at four-year intervals (one standard government term, even if many government coalitions between 1984 and 2012 fell earlier) became the main form of guidance, recently called the minister’s ‘strategic agenda.’ A major addition coming after the data collection for the autonomy scorecard, ostensibly intended to increase autonomy and diversity of the system, but at the same time bringing central control back in, were the performance contracts in 2012-2016: control was exerted through a set of seven indicators of efficiency and quality of education every institution had to attend to, though they could choose their own ambition levels. Financial consequences were attached to setting the ambitions and to not reaching them (Vossensteyn and Westerheijden 2016).

The social-democrat principles of open and free access to higher education changed into open access but with every student paying a symbolic fee since the 1970s; nationally-determined fees increased rapidly in the 2000s, against governmental cut-backs. Fees and student support remained political issues ever since, with strict state control.

Following NPM deregulation, academics lost civil servant status and became university employees. Universities maintained uniform national salary levels in collective agreements with labour unions, as in most
sectors of the Dutch economy.

According to the autonomy scorecard summary (Figure 3), ‘Organisational, financial and staffing autonomy are rated as “medium high” in the Netherlands. Academic autonomy is more limited and therefore rated as “medium low.”’

![Autonomy Scorecard](source: www.university-autonomy.eu)

**Figure 3** The Netherlands’ Autonomy Scorecard

### 2.4 Japan

The major reform moment in governance of Japan’s national universities was their change from public agencies under the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEXT) to ‘national university corporations’ (NUCs) in 2004. With this ‘incorporation,’ universities were given more procedural autonomy. In earlier NPM-like reforms, substantive autonomy had been enlarged in 1994-1998, i.e. more autonomy was given to shape study programmes in exchange for introducing self-evaluation and, later external evaluation and accreditation at the institutional level (Varghese and Martin 2013).
Discussion focuses on the position and powers of the university presidents, which have been enlarged much through the incorporation. The president has become like a company’s CEO and with the team of vice-presidents and advisors is responsible for autonomous decisions especially regarding budget expenditure, staffing and salaries. In the financial area, however, most decisions require approval by MEXT, just like in academic areas (starting study programmes, fee levels). Moreover, ex ante regulation has been replaced by six-year Medium-Term Plans, which need prior approval by MEXT, which are subject to strict accountability with annual reporting and ex post evaluation on behalf of MEXT (Oba, 2013) and where failure to achieve annual goals entails financial consequences. The formally-existing level of procedural autonomy as shown in the scorecard may be experienced as rather lower by the national universities. In Figure 4 the relatively large degree of autonomy regarding staffing is remarkable. In other areas, some indicators show ‘spikes’ of high autonomy amid moderately high state control on others.

Figure 4  Autonomy Scorecard Japan
2.5 Comparison of Findings

The findings regarding the three countries can be summarised graphically (Figure 5). Even at the abstract level of whole dimensions it becomes clear that the UK and Japan have such high scores that they dominate\(^3\) the Netherlands regarding staffing. On organisation and academic autonomy, the UK dominates. Within this dimension, Japan weakly dominates the Netherlands on student admission indicators and quality assurance. Concerning programme design (and termination) and language of instruction the situation is reversed. On financial autonomy, both European countries seem to dominate Japan. Drilling down to the constituent indicators, the UK proves most autonomous regarding tuition fees; the Netherlands dominates weakly on the other indicators of financial autonomy.

![Figure 5](image-url)  
**Figure 5** Comparison of Autonomy by Dimensions
3. Governance within the University: Managerial and Academic Self-Governance

Consequences of the level of autonomy for intra-institutional management, especially the balance between managers and academics will be treated through two strategic issues: appointment of executive head officers and control over quality of education. Collegial, shared governance has been held up as beneficial for education (and research) throughout university history (de Ridder-Symoens 1992). What happened to it under NPM with its stress on management?

3.1 United Kingdom

Regarding intra-university governance, a ‘managerial turn’ took place (de Boer et al. 2010), and the ‘dönish dominion’ by senior academics came to an end (Halsey 1982). Managers see themselves as buffers between academics and society, thus maintaining some degree of academic self-governance (de Boer et al. 2010).

The ‘CEO’ of a British university is usually called Vice-Chancellor (VC), often appointed for five years. Each university may develop its own regulations including appointment procedure for VC’s, but they typically apply the following pattern (Kolster, Vossensteyn, de Boer, and Jongbloed 2016). The Council (the highest administrative body of a university, with internal representatives, but with a majority of external stakeholders) appoints a search committee, often chaired by the Council’s chairperson. After public announcement, and sometimes with aid of head-hunters, a shortlist of candidates is drawn up. After interviews of shortlisted candidates with academics, administrative staff, students and others, the search committee advises a candidate to the Council, which appoints the VC. Often, candidates are found outside the university, sometimes outside academia.

The VC is often mandated by the Council to appoint other executives and deans. It has become increasingly rare that academics elect faculties’ deans (Kolster et al. 2016).

Quality assurance of education was a spearhead area for NPM reforms
in the UK. Eventually, institutional audit emerged as the core evaluation method since 2002 (QAA 2009). Audits focus on how the university itself manages its quality, which strengthens managers in comparison with academics. Programme-level assessments are mainly limited to accreditation of professional studies. In other areas too, national qualifications frameworks limit the freedom of curriculum design, but this external guidance is ‘filtered’ through institutional managers.

In sum, external stakeholders seem to dominate the appointment of the VC, while VCs and their administrators seem to dominate academics in substantive matters.

3.2 The Netherlands

Within universities, post-1968 democratic structures with elected leadership were replaced with managerial ones through the 1997 ‘MUB’ law. Institutions were put at a distance from the Ministry, becoming accountable to a lay Supervisory Board, which appointed the (usually three) members of the Executive Board: President, Rector (approximately: VP Academic Affairs) and third member (usually: VP Finance). The appointment procedures are regulated by each university separately (Kolster et al. 2016). Usually, the Executive Board sets up a search committee with senior representatives from within the university and submits a proposal to the Supervisory Board, who make the formal appointment.

The power balance between president and rector varies depending on local circumstances and personalities. The Executive Board appoints faculty deans. Presidents tend to be recruited outside universities. Rectors and most deans are professors though not necessarily from the same university; academic legitimacy is important for their functioning with academics. Academic management is becoming a career path for some professors.

University and faculty senates, with 50% academic representatives and 50% students, have been reduced from strong controlling councils to, largely, advisory bodies, while ‘decisions about academic matters have been centralized within universities’ (de Boer et al. 2010: 143).
Since 2003, quality of education is mainly regulated through programme accreditation under rather strict assessment frameworks. Institutional audits are only supplementary and may make programme accreditation less onerous but still obligatory (NVAO 2016). Between 1987 and 2003, external quality assurance had been coordinated by the collective universities with strong disciplinary input, i.e. dominated by academics (and management). Since 2003, the public accreditation agency’s guidance became dominant.

Thus, external stakeholder guidance has increased in substantive matters; academics feel less empowered than previously and management has gained power in procedural areas but not so much in education.

3.3 Japan

The ministry of education (MEXT) formulated amongst its aims for 2013-15 and beyond: ‘Enable university presidents to exercise leadership abilities and build governance’ (MEXT, s.a. [2016]). Also JANU advocated ‘strengthening presidents’ (JANU 2013: 22). Apparently, the 2004 reforms have not been sufficiently successful in this regard. The appointment procedure gives some hints in this direction, too. First, Presidential Selection Committees are constituted by the lay-majority Administrative Council and the internally constituted senate. Second, elections are held in virtually all national universities like before 2004, though now as non-binding consultations. Presidential Selection Committees rarely deviate from the academics’ preferences. Hence like before, most presidents hail from large faculties within the university and emerge because of their academic reputation. They typically have had academic leadership experience, e.g. as faculty deans, or vice-presidents. Yet, outside appointments characterise especially smaller universities, where maintaining good network relationships with MEXT - the main source of institutional income - incites to appointing former civil servants as presidents. The minister of education formally appoints the president.

Evaluation procedures by independent, state-accredited agencies mostly focus on the institutional level (NIAD-UE 2014) and oversee all areas of activity, not just education’s quality. Professional accreditation exists in
selected areas. Introduction of six-year ‘Mid-Term Plans’ with previous approval, annual monitoring and ex post evaluation re-instated close control by MEXT simultaneous with universities’ incorporation (Huang 2006, NIAD-UE 2014), although universities may negotiate their own indicators and ambition levels. The (financial) need to achieve the goals set increases management’s internal power.

In sum, within universities, management has strengthened considerably in procedural matters (Christensen 2011, Oba 2013), while in substantive issues, academic self-governance through the faculties’ kyoju-kai remains strong (Yonezawa 2014).

3.4 Comparison of Findings

In the two European countries as in Japan, managerial power has evidently increased since introduction of NPM governance reform to the detriment of academic self-governance within the university in procedural matters. In substantive matters, Japanese academics have retained more power than their European colleagues; traditions apparently have a stronger hold in Japan than in Europe. In the UK, management dominates also in substantive matters, while in the Netherlands external stakeholder guidance has intensified concerning substantive control.

4. Conclusion

The large changes in the UK have been ascribed to the ‘drastic’ Thatcher government and to the late massification of Britain’s higher education (de Boer et al. 2010: 149). Nevertheless, British universities continue as the most autonomous in Europe. A new class of powerful managers has arisen there, reducing the academic self-governance that had stood out perhaps ever since the founding of the University of Oxford (Halsey 1982, de Ridder-Symoens 1992, F. A. van Vught 1994). The Netherlands exemplifies a mixed approach to NPM, with strong network governance tendencies, i.e. a neo-Weberian state (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The Netherlands’ mixed picture in the autonomy scorecard resembles Japan’s ‘post-NPM’ (Christensen 2011) situation of strong
autonomy in parts of some areas and state control either through regulation (perhaps more typical for Japan) or external stakeholder guidance (perhaps more prominent in the Netherlands, though the Mid-Term Plans are conspicuous illustrations in Japan). Possibly at the cost of a high degree of bureaucratisation of internal management, Japanese academics have retained more of their previous academic self-governance than Dutch and British colleagues. In Japan, ‘the “old” university system was characterized by low formal autonomy but high actual autonomy’ (Christensen 2011: 511) - a case of low-intensity on all ‘sliders’ of the governance equalizer, or *laissez-faire*. With higher education becoming increasingly central in the knowledge economy, *laissez-faire* was no longer an option even for (neo-)liberal governments.

Academic self-governance, also called collegial decision making (Clark 1983) or shared governance (Shattock 2002), is often portrayed as the ideal for long-term beneficial development of higher education. Governance reform is often based on (admittedly highly relevant!) short-term governmental desires regarding knowledge transfer for innovation and education for employment. It goes beyond this article to study if such governmental desires are realised through the reforms in the UK, the Netherlands or Japan. It has been shown, though, that shared governance has deteriorated in all three countries, while managerial self-guidance tended to increase and external stakeholder guidance partly replaced governmental regulation but also made inroads on academic self-governance.

**Notes**

1) I use the term ‘university’ as a shorthand for any type of higher education institution.

2) Not quite the more common triangle of market, hierarchy and networks (Powell 1991), although network mechanisms certainly play a role in peer-based collegial decision making.

3) The 2016 version retained all indicators of 2010 and added qualitative information helpful in interpreting the quantitative indicators, partly
because ‘Autonomy is a concept that is understood very differently across Europe; associated perceptions and terminology tend to vary quite significantly’ (Pruvot and Estermann 2017: 11).

4) Four higher education systems were only present in the 2010 version (CY, CZ, GR, TR), to be replaced by four others (BE-FR, HR, RS, SI) in the 2016 version of the autonomy scorecard (Pruvot and Estermann 2017). The two systems of interest in this paper participated in both versions, though, and showed very few (UK) to no (NL) differences in the two versions.

5) In ordinal comparison, weak dominance of A over B is defined as A scoring higher than B on at least one indicator and equal to B on all others.

6) Universities’ internal regulations require approval from the national government (Privy Council).

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### Annex  Autonomy Scorecard Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>UK (England)</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational</strong></td>
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<td>Selection procedure for executive head</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selection criteria for executive head</td>
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<td>Dismissal of executive head</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term of office of executive head</td>
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<td>100%</td>
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<td>External members in university governing bodies</td>
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<td>50%</td>
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<td>Capacity to decide on academic structures</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>Capacity to create legal entities</td>
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<td>Length of public funding cycle</td>
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<td>Type of public funding</td>
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<td>Ability to borrow money</td>
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<td>Ability to own buildings</td>
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<td>60%</td>
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<td>40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuition fees for EU students at Master's level <em>(Japan: national students)</em></td>
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<td>Tuition fees for EU students at doctoral level <em>(Japan: national students)</em></td>
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<td>Tuition fees for non-EU students at Bachelor level <em>(Japan: international students)</em></td>
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<td>Tuition fees for non-EU students at Master's level <em>(Japan: international students)</em></td>
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<td><strong>Staffing</strong></td>
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<td>Academic</td>
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<td>Overall student numbers</td>
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<td>Admissions procedures at Bachelor level</td>
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<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admissions procedures at Master’s level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Introduction of programmes at Bachelor level</td>
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<td>Introduction of programmes at doctoral level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Termination of degree programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language of instruction at Bachelor level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language of instruction at Master’s level</td>
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<td>Selection of quality assurance mechanisms</td>
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<td>Selection of quality assurance providers</td>
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<td>Capacity to design content of degree programmes</td>
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イギリス・オランダ・日本における大学のガバナンス

－NPM手法による改革後の大学自治とシェアード・ガバナンス－

ドナルド F. ウェスター・ハイデン

＜要　旨＞

本稿では、ヨーロッパと日本の高等教育制度におけるガバナンスに関する改革を比較・対照しつつ、国家レベルでのガバナンス改革が大学のシェアド・ガバナンスに与える結果に焦点をあてて検討する。ヨーロッパ諸国ではイギリスとオランダを取り上げるが、両国の事例は相互に大きく異なっている。検討を通じて、「大学自治スコアカード」に基づいて体系的な比較を行うとともに、「ガバナンス・イコライザー」を用いて応用的な概念を抽出する。これらの指標を用いて、組織、財政、教職員、教育の４領域で簡単な比較を行う。

英・蘭・日３カ国におけるNPM手法による主要なガバナンス改革についてみると、以下の点が明らかになる。英では大学自治の余地がまだ大きいのに対して、蘭・日ではポストNPM手法の改革とミックスしたガバナンスが支配的であり異なった形で機関レベルの自治に影響を与えている。機関レベルの自治の幅は、３カ国とも拡大している面と縮小している面の両方がみられる。執行責任者（学長）の選出・任命や教育の質保証システムは、機関におけるシェアド・ガバナンスにとって戦略的に重要な指標と考えられる。管理的かつ外部からの圧力は、日本よりも英・蘭の方がより強いが、3カ国とも大学自身による自律的ガバナンスは後退している。