Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education: Implications for Academic Productivity and Professional Autonomy

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<Abstract>

This paper addresses the change in governance of universities in Europe and its effects on academic work, especially productivity and professional autonomy. Drawing on the institutional logics perspective (Thornton and Ocasio 2008) and the governance equalizer model (De Boer, Enders and Schimank 2007) we observe that New Public Management inspired reforms have led to stronger managerial and stakeholder guidance in most European systems, while at the same time, academic oligarchy is still powerful, especially in the systems following the Humboldtian higher education tradition (e.g. Germany). I argue that Academic logic based on the Mertonian (1973) values of science where higher education is public good is being challenged by the Quasi-market logic that is based on proprietary values and is manifested in private appropriation of financial returns in European higher education.

Studies show that even though in the context of higher education reforms productivity may be increasing as measured by traditional indicators, it may come at the cost of reducing professional autonomy. Statistics shows that in Germany, France and the UK the number of publications and patents has steadily increased in the period 2008-2015. At the same time the pressure to perform has increased academic workloads, especially due to increased administrative procedures. The stronger institutional imperative to attract external research funding has encouraged more mainstream research topics as well as more short-term research horizons. Academics in this context use a range of

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strategies to maintain their ‘protected spaces’ (Rip 2011). While for some disciplines and star academics it has been possible to do so, for junior academics and disciplines such as, for example, humanities, it has been a challenge, as shown in the example of historians. Thus, for some disciplines the institutional complexity with the prevalence of Quasi-market logic may change what counts as an output and what knowledge is produced, which in the end may have implications for the attractiveness of the academic profession.

1. Introduction

Since 1980s the New Public Management (NPM) reforms in European Higher Education (HE) have been widespread and have been instrumental in changing governance arrangements between the states and universities. Some authors have portrayed these reforms as an attack on academic profession and professional autonomy, while others have argued these reforms have brought rationalized decision-making processes and other instruments which increased productivity and efficiency of HE systems. As the systems have been expanding massively and the financing of higher education has increasingly become an issue for national governments, NPM has been an attractive policy rhetoric to decrease the burden of the state purse using private sources of income in HE via tuition fees or industrial funding.

As part of reforms, the management of universities has been strengthened, their accountability to the state as well as other stakeholders has increased. Consequently organizational control has been strengthened which has caused tensions for academics at universities (Bleiklie et al. 2015). However, how do governance arrangements change in different contexts and what do these governance transformations mean for academic work and especially for productivity and professional autonomy remains unclear even though some of the studies to date have addressed some of these aspects (Leišytė and Dee 2012, Leišytė 2016, De Boer, Enders and Schimank 2010).

Thus, in this paper we aim to understand how and why are the governance arrangements in European higher education changing? How do
academics respond to the managerial reforms and what does it mean for productivity and professional autonomy?

We start with an overview of the key system reforms in European higher education and point to the prominence of New Public Management rhetoric behind them. Further, we present the theoretical concepts of institutional logics, governance dimensions as well as protected spaces. Afterwards we provide an example of governance change in Germany and especially in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia followed by the presentation of the key trends in productivity and professional autonomy in European higher education. Drawing on the example of the study of historians in the UK and the Netherlands we illustrate the issues surrounding protective spaces in academia under managerial changes and especially the implications of governance shifts for research outputs and choice of research topics.

2. Key System Reforms in European Higher Education

In the past decades profound changes in higher education have been observed. They have been part and parcel of the overall societal shift from the society rooted in the Gemeinschaft system towards the system based on impersonal and competitive relations which are grounded in commodification, bureaucratization and impersonal ties of competitive exchange and contract in Tönnies words – the Gesellschaft. The New Public Management (NPM) inspired reforms of public sectors have been part and parcel of this societal shift heralded in the UK in the 1980s. These reforms fostered the introduction of markets in the public administration and spread the idea that actors are accountable for what they do and the state develops the instruments to monitor and appraise them (Olssen 1996). In higher education, NPM was mainly introduced in European countries in the 1990s, where deregulation and privatization of higher education has been taking place with the goal of making the systems work more efficiently and effectively (Leišytė and Dee 2012). On the one hand the state ‘steers at a distance’ with evaluation and other accountability measures. On the other hand, a range of stakeholders from industry as well as civil society has increased their participation at different decision – making levels in running higher
education. Thus the movement “from government to governance” can be observed (Enders et al. 2009). The multi-level and multi-actor governance (Leišytė and Dee 2012) has been also influenced by increasing globalization as well as local communities and authorities (Broucker et al. 2016). Thus, the governance arrangements and power balances within higher education systems have been significantly changing although at different pace and different points of time (Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2008, Broucker et al. 2016).

At the same time, as in the 1990s, today further rationalization of the higher education systems is observed due to further development of ‘Quasi-markets’ in higher education. This propels the competition for students, staff as well as other resources among the systems as well as universities. NPM further promotes accountability and efficiency at universities (Pollitt, Van Thiel, and Homburg, 2007). In the past decade the key rationalization policies across Europe have introduced system and institutional changes, such as, building alliances and clusters of research and development (e.g. Poles de Recherche et d’Enseignement Superieur in France in 2008), merging institutions in the name of improving quality or ‘saving’ money (e.g. Denmark in 2007, Finland in 2010, Lithuania in 2018), as well as stratification and profiling of universities (e.g. the Research Excellence Initiative in Germany since 2006).

Further, accountability between universities and the ministries of education has increasingly been formalized in performance agreements which are more based on output than on input measures, as, for instance, in Germany, Finland, or the Netherlands. On the research side, the national evaluations of research performance to monitor the ‘quality’ of research have also been introduced in various European countries (e.g. the UK, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic). Performance-based funding across European higher education systems has gone hand in hand with the deregulation. During the period 2007-2013, the overall funding for research has increased in some countries and was distributed on a more competitive basis, e.g. in Germany GERD increased from 69.5% to 83.8%. The increase in funding of higher education is also observed in other parts of the world like USA and Japan, so the trends observed in Germany are largely in line with
developments in other OECD countries.

As a result of deregulation, the managerial core of the universities was strengthened through giving more powers to the Presidents and Rectors as well as the introduction of supervisory boards comprised of external stakeholders. It has been noted that overall the NPM-based public reforms have transformed universities from loosely coupled systems to strategic actors which, in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness, became more professionally managed and performance-driven organizations (Krücken et al. 2013). This new type of university is being referred to as managerial university (Deem et al. 2007). The main characteristics of a managerial university include 1) top-down decision making and strengthened performance evaluation of academic employees 2) rationalized budgeting and diversification of resource base relying on external funding (research money obtained e.g. from research councils and industry), 3) implementation of efficiency measures and increased accountability to the management (Leišytė and Dee 2012). As a result, academics are evaluated on the basis of the revenue and commercial value that they generate and are rewarded based on their performance (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). This makes them increasingly dependent on the requirements of external funders and university management.

Looking at the dynamics of human resources in higher education in Europe, one can observe a steady increase. In fact, the number of academics has been increasing in quite a few systems in Europe as a result of the increase in external competitive research funding. If we look at the number of researchers from 2007 to 2013, we can observe that France, Germany and the UK have increased their human resource capacities in higher education. Germany in this regard stands out with the increase from 290,900 in 2007 to 360,300 in 2013 (see Figure 1). A similar development is also observed in the US although in Japan the number of researchers has contracted over this period of time.
3. Theoretical Considerations

In this paper we turn to institutional logics perspective as well as the governance equalizer model to understand the shifts in university governance taking place across European higher education. Further, we draw on the concept of protected spaces that academics create and maintain.

3.1 Institutional Logics and Governance Mechanisms

We use the Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) definition of an Institutional logic. They define it as “the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and re-produce their material substance, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their socially reality.” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999: 804) Societies have been guided by a range of logics stemming from social orders such as state, corporation, community, market, profession. When it comes to higher education, professional and market logics seem to be opposing each other and possibly conflicting, thus, in the following we will focus on two seemingly opposite logics – market and professional logics.

Professional logic includes adherence to the values of profession
(Kitchener 2002) and in higher education sector this would imply adhering to the values of academic profession. We call it Academic logic as it is based on the Mertonian (1973) values of science such as Universalism, Communalism, Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism, where peer-review is central as the key justification of value and prestige. Relations in scientific community are based on traditions and mutual obligations. Collegiality is at the center of this logic where science and higher education are public good. In scientific communities guided by the academic logic professional autonomy is of high regard. Identification with the university as an organization is very loose and academic identities are mainly shaped by disciplinary communities. Control is exerted by the esteemed peers in the scientific community who act as gate-keepers in peer review processes and determine the quality of scientific work. Following this logic, university is a loosely – coupled organization which guards professional values. Academics have professional autonomy in carrying out the main two functions of academic work – teaching and research (Fini and Lacetera 2010, Murray 2010).

In contrast, Quasi-market logic is based on proprietary values and is manifested in private appropriation of financial returns (Teixeira, Jongbloed, Dill, and Amaral 2006). As there are no perfect markets in state subsidized and largely steered systems, we term this logic quasi-market logic. Following Polanyi (1944), in competition-based society the economic gain becomes “the major justification for action and behavior in everyday life.” (p.30) Thus, the Quasi-market logic in higher education transpires in bureaucratic control, restrictions on disclosure in science, and the rationalized performance measurement (Sauermann and Stephan 2013: 891). Following this logic at universities organizational managers and vested stakeholders are at the center of defining value and prestige on the one hand, and control instruments and procedures ensure the monitoring of the ‘success’ and ‘added value’ created by universities. The performance criteria following this logic are defined outside the academic community (Leišytė 2014).

We argue that among other, these two institutional logics predominantly guide the modes of governance in higher education (Leišytė 2014). It is suggested that different institutional logics co-exist at the same time and the
complexity of institutional logics is increasing as the academic logic guiding academic self-regulation is being challenged by the Quasi-market logic which may lead to a very different environment for academic work (Greenwood et al. 2010, Thornton and Ocasio 2008).

However, how to understand this institutional complexity in governance of HE systems? We turn to the governance equalizer model which consists of five governance dimensions. This model helps us understand the particular constellation of actors and distribution of their power in the higher education coordination system (De Boer, Enders, and Schimank 2007): academic self-governance, competition for resources, managerial self-governance, state regulation, and stakeholder guidance.

- Academic self-governance is rooted in disciplinary communities and is exercised through collegial decision-making practices at universities and in the national agencies where academic communities participate in deciding on resources.
- Competition for resources is the mechanism that is exercised through competition for research funds, personnel, students and prestige.
- Managerial self-governance concerns the role of university leadership, organizational decision-making structures and centralization of decision-making processes, professional management and professional administration at universities.
- State regulation is the traditional mechanism of governance with the top-down authority vested in the state. The regulation by directives prescribes the behavior of higher education institutions in detail.
- Stakeholder guidance is the mechanism based on goal setting and advice provided by various societal stakeholders (including the government).

To envision the linkages between different types of logics and the five governance mechanisms, we use a ‘low – medium – high’ scales, with ‘low’ denoting limited presence of a particular logic, and with ‘high’ signifying the dominating role of a particular logic guiding a particular governance mechanism (Leišytė 2014). The governance mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, as each of them can change irrespective of stability or change in the other mechanism. Leišytė (2014) argues that a certain dominant logic
shapes the creation of a particular configuration of governance of higher education in a given system at a particular point of time. The dominance of the Academic logic provides the grounds for strong academic self-governance as one can see in the Humboldtian model of university. Competition for resources following this logic is low, while managerial self-governance and state regulation can be low to medium. Following this logic, stakeholder guidance can be medium, especially in terms of state guidance. In case of the Quasi-market logic dominance in higher education, on the other hand, one can expect the governance mode with high level of competition for resources, strong managerial self-governance and strong stakeholder guidance. At the same time, under this logic low state regulation and low academic self-governance would be expected (Ibid).

3.2 Understanding Academic Responses

In this paper we focus on two aspects of academic work – research productivity and professional autonomy. To understand the institutional complexity and how it affects productivity we turn to the dichotomy of research outputs as they illustrate very well the potential clash between the openness of science for public benefit versus proprietary interests of the market. Firstly, traditional research outputs in academia are peer-reviewed publications. They are part and parcel of open science – where knowledge is public and ideally accessible to all. On the other hand, patenting is the proprietary type of research output that protects it from overall access. Patents are deemed important in commercialization of knowledge and bringing in possibly commercial value if they are licensed from universities to industry.

When it comes to professional autonomy we concentrate on the freedom to choose own research topics and being able freely pursue own research interests, such as for example, risky research lines. Here a notion of ‘protective space’ (Rip 2011) is important – as it is the space where academics can choose research topics of their own choosing and produce outputs they like and deem important for their academic community. Given the conflicting notions of academic self-governance versus managerial governance and the aims of efficiency versus scientific excellence, an increasing duality between
the academic profession and the university as organization has been observed (e.g. Noordegraaf 2011). A typical reaction of professions to such dualities is creating and maintaining protective spaces and maintaining professional identities via strategic positioning and strategic responses (Leišytė 2015).

Not having protective space to pursue one’s research agenda may lead to a potential clash between being relevant to the needs of economy and conducting high quality research in some disciplines. Not having secure funding of research may lead to abolishing certain research lines or the change of work roles of academics. Following previous research, we can expect academics to respond to the dominance of the Quasi-market logic in their institutional environment through a range of strategies, which may range from collective acts of resistance to more individual ways (Nentwich and Hoyer 2013, Leišytė and Hosch-Dayican 2017).

4. Governance and Institutional Complexity in German Higher Education

To illustrate the changing institutional complexity in higher education we turn to the German higher education system. This system is complex due to its federal organization with 16 state (Länder) governments that govern universities in their respective states. The HE systems of the 16 states are rooted in the same Humboldtian idea of academic freedom. The core historical feature of the governance of higher education is characterized by the power of professors (chairs) which traditionally has come hand in hand with the subordination to the state. As noted by Schimank (2005), the system could be characterized by chairs who act as ‘businessmen who cannot go bankrupt’ (p.363) as they hold the public servant status and have job security for life. This has meant that although the individual professional autonomy of professors has been high in teaching and research, organizational autonomy of universities has been quite low as the state was controlling many aspects of decision-making in higher education as well as was the main funder of the system (Ibid.). In 2015, the German system of higher education consisted of 88 universities (Universitäten), 104 universities of applied sciences
(Fachhochschulen) and 46 universities of art and music (Kunst-und
Musikhochschulen) (HRK 2015). In 2014-2015 academic year 64% of all
students were studying at universities and the number of students has been
steadily increasing over the past decade by nearly a million.

In the past decades NPM reforms have been a popular policy slogan in the
German higher education policy context (Schimank 2005) – as in many other
European countries. Most recent reforms generally have moved in the same
direction of gradual marketization, albeit at different speeds (Hüther and
Krücken 2018). Even though the complexity of the reforms and their
different guises is obvious, Schimank (2005) has argued that NPM entails
actually an integrated approach to overhaul the whole higher education
system in Germany to replace ‘the old regime dominated by a state-regulated
profession, with a new regime, dominated by a market – and state-driven
organization’ where the ministries force the reforms upon universities
replacing direct control with management by objectives (Schimank 2005: 366).

As the governance of higher education varies among the 16 states, to
understand the shifts in governance we turn to the example of one state –
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) as it has the highest density of universities
and research institutions in Germany and has embraced the NPM reforms to
quite some extent and even introduced tuition fees albeit for a short period of
time.

North Rhine-Westphalia is one of the states that has been active in
managerial turn of higher education since 2000 with passing the NRW
University Autonomy Law in 2004. The autonomy here was more a keyword
to give stronger powers to university management and weaken the powers
of professors, while at the same time, foster accountability measures to
universities from the state. Performance agreements as well as yearly
reporting to the ministry continue to be the practice and one can see that
this brought even more bureaucracy to universities.

This state has a particular history and has a dense web of universities and
universities of applied sciences. It has faced a decline in steel and coal
industries and universities have been part and parcel of the policy to create
knowledge-based economy since 1960s. The system expansion has led to 30
universities and 43 universities of applied sciences in NRW. Traditionally, universities were tightly controlled by the Ministry of Education while professors had individual freedom to carry out teaching and research of their own choosing. The Senate was an important decision-making body as it elected rectors. Even though it had an advisory and control function of the Rectorate, over the years its importance has decreased. The chairs (professors) in this state traditionally were very independent and powerful – where decision-making in the faculties was reached by consensus to ensure that no one is seriously dissatisfied. This system has maintained the status quo for decades in terms of protecting professional autonomy on the one hand and halting any serious change in the structures and procedures unless it benefits everyone involved (Schimank 2005).

In NRW the Ministry of Education has, however, as part of the reforms, lost some of its powers even though a statutory amendment passed in 2015 gave further strength through target and performance indicators and controls (Enders et al. 2013). The state of NRW monitors the performance of universities in terms of numbers of graduates and research productivity, which inevitably leads to comparisons between universities and different funding levels. Third party funding is increasingly seen as an important indicator of performance at universities. University professors appointed in the past decades follow the new system of salary scales which are partly based on these performance-based indicators. At the same time, the implementation of this system varies also depending on the university (Schimank 2005).

In terms of the role of external stakeholders in university governance important changes have taken place. Since 2007, universities in NRW have established University Supervisory Boards which consist of external stakeholders, such as industry representatives as well as members of civil society groups. The 2004 Law allowed universities to hire professors. The more recent 2014 Universities’ Future Law gave more power to the Supervisory Boards as they now can monitor the Rectorate to a greater extent (Higher Education Act of 2014, § 16, 19, 21). The University Board is smaller in size than the Senate and checks financial health of the university (Kretek and Dragsic 2012), but their composition, size and actual
responsibilities vary from university to university.

One can say that the legal provisions in NRW envisage negotiations between the Senate, the Rectorate, and the Supervisory Board. It is still rather atypical to make a single-handed decision at a university (Hüther and Krücken 2018). At the same time, collegial decision-making prevails in practice (Ibid.). The informal norm of collegiality is as strong as before and has an impact on the actual decision-making processes in higher education institutions (Kleimann 2015, Bieletzki 2018). Thus, even though the concentration of decision-making power among Supervisory Boards and Rectorates has formally increased, these changes cannot always take place in practice because as argued by Hüther and Krücken (2018), the conditions for a top-down hierarchy at a German university do not exist. Academics retain their power in practice, although these are usually the elites who are well represented in governance of universities as well as have strong alliances with the government and/or industry (Ibid.). Sometimes the managers do not have managerial tools at their disposal – such as, for example – the flexibility to fire academic staff. At the same time, academics retain power in terms of control of key processes and in this regard the managerial turn has not yet taken place (Krücken et al. 2013). When it comes to professional autonomy of the chairs and their departments, their freedom is protected by the German Constitution, thus, there is very little leeway for the management to influence the content of academic work.

When it comes to another important governance dimension – competition – the federal level policies in German higher education have been influential, mainly through the power of the purse. One example of this is the Excellence initiative that started in 2006 to promote a certain number of research universities and strengthen graduate schools. Following this policy, a set number of universities are selected to receive funding for different research initiatives over extended period of time. This has pushed the system towards differentiation among universities. Another significant competitive federal funding instrument was created to promote excellent teaching (2 bn Euro in total) by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). According to Wilkesmann (2016), this money distribution meant that many bottom-up initiatives started at each university and that these funds were extremely
beneficial to the universities of applied sciences which traditionally have received less third-party funding compared to other universities in Germany. Still, they were distributed on a competitive basis where universities had to submit project proposals to improve the quality of teaching. Finally, at the state level, external funding has also become more important over the years as state ministries provide competitive grants to universities and academics. At present, around one third of universities’ budgets come from third party funding – which includes federal and state ministry funding as well as industry funding.

Competition has also been propelled by rankings of all sorts. For example, the German CHE ranking of university programmes has added to the competitive pressures for the university management to compete and profile their universities as best as they can. One can observe that facing competition German universities have been opening up to internationalization, publishing and teaching more in English, attracting foreign staff and students, marketing themselves more fiercely.

Thus, we could summarize that universities in NRW have increased their institutional autonomy vis-a-vis the state, regulation of the state has been substituted by state guidance through performance agreements. The influence of external stakeholders’ role has increased over the past two decades to a medium level due to the involvement of Supervisory Board in financial matters as well as setting the Rector to account. Further, the competition for resources has increased in terms of attracting third party funding and other resources. Managerial self-regulation has increased due to the powers allocated to them by the latest Law in NRW, like appointment of professors and strategy setting. At the same time, the hierarchical steering in practice is limited, as the de facto power of academic self-regulation remains rather strong. Thus, we can observe that the Quasi-market logic is not yet dominant in the NRW university governance, even though it has been guiding a range of new policies, procedures and creation of new structures. Certain elements of governance following Quasi-market logic are embraced as can be observed in the increased role of external stakeholders, competition for resources as well as less state interference in higher education. One can assert that academic logic is co-existing in sometimes
conflicting ways with the quasi-market logic in higher education in NRW, where the concrete institutionalization depends on the particular policy issue and area, as well as on the type and history of the university. Thus, the example of NRW HE governance confirms what other authors have observed – German higher education has followed a soft NPM orientation (Hüther and Krücken 2018).

5. Implications for Academic Work: Productivity

Looking at the trends of productivity in terms of journal publications and patenting among the highly industrialized big countries we can observe an increasing number of publications per million of inhabitants between 2008 and 2014. When we look at the OECD countries as well as big EU countries – we can see overall increase in productivity when measured in journal international publications per million inhabitants. Even though it is a simplistic and crude measure which does not include books and book chapters – and thus excludes to some extent some disciplines, it is useful for understanding a general trend of changing research productivity. Here we see that the traditional production of scientific publications in line with the Academic logic is maintained and strengthened across the board (See Figure 2).

![Publication Change per Million Inhabitants](image)

Source: UNESCO (2015)
When we examine this trend in more detail, we can see that the highest increase in publication percentage among the selected countries is achieved in Germany, that is by 15.4% over the period 2008-2014 (see Figure 3). At the same time, the productivity increase in the UK reaches 14%. While Germany represents a soft NPM country, the UK is the most neoliberal and managerial higher education system in Europe—a hard NPM country. This leaves us puzzled—is there no relationship between shifts in governance of higher education and productivity? Or is it specific elements of governance, like for example, increased competition—that matters most for the increase in publications even in the soft NPM regime? Or is it about the increase in R&D staff numbers (in the UK it increased only slightly while in Germany in increased significantly over the studied period) while in Japan the decrease in publications is also seen alongside the decreased academic staff numbers? But then—how about France, which has increased staff numbers significantly, but did not increase the productivity in publishing as high as German academics did? These questions bring us to one possible interpretation: path dependency matters how institutional complexity of Quasi-market logic and Academic logic play out in a specific context and how academics behave in terms of research productivity. Further, when it comes to changes in academic behavior—as we saw in a number of studies (Leišytė et al. 2010, Teelken 2012) with NPM gaming starts where the quantity but not necessarily the quality matter. If the incentives are directly geared towards the key producers—academic staff—and this supports their credibility building—then the likelihood of changing behavior is higher.
When we examine productivity in terms of production of patents as an example of proprietary output, we observe an overall increase across the studied countries. Based on the UNESCO 2015 data, we can see that in the countries we have studied the filing of patents in the EU has been significantly increasing – with France being the highest performer, followed by the UK and Germany. All these countries have strong industrial base – as also do Japan and the US. Here again it is difficult to see big difference between hard and soft NPM countries. Obviously, this indicator is strongly correlated with the industrial bases in these countries and industrial competitiveness and given that the US and Japan have been high patent producers for decades, the relatively low change percentage does not mean low overall performance. Overall, one can see that the Quasi-market logic is increasingly enacted through patenting activity across the big selected OECD and European countries (See Figure 4).
Thus, looking at the two key productivity indicators – journal publications and patenting, we can observe an overall increase in the selected big industrialized countries. Germany stands out when it comes to the increase in international journal publications and it has been increasingly performing well in terms of patenting increases. So seemingly when it comes to productivity – both logics – Academic logic as well as Quasi-Market logic are at play.

To understand how governance shifts have affected professional autonomy, we turn to the studies observing the changes in academic work in Germany at more micro-level. German academics perceive the changes in governance as an attack on professional autonomy (Hüther and Krücken 2018). The ‘attack’ on universities (Hüther and Krücken 2018) leads to individualization, loss of collegial values and the essence of what academy is about – academic freedom (Leišytė and Dee 2012). One of the major concerns is related to the disruption of teaching-research nexus so important to the Humboldtian model of higher education. With the incentives and pressures towards research performance as well as intrinsic motivation to build scientific reputation which leads to the institution “research matters” (Wilkesmann 2016), teaching is perceived as not that important activity...
which may have serious implications for the future of the universities (Leišytė, De Boer, and Enders 2009).

Quite a few studies have shown that performance measurements from the ministries or quality assurance agencies lead to ‘box ticking’ mentality (Leišytė 2007, Jansen 2010, Kehm and Lanzendorf 2006), where the academic performance is narrowed down to a set of performance indicators which do not necessarily show the innovation and contribution to science and skews what matters for academic work towards research even more away from teaching (Leišytė and Wilkesmann 2017, Hűther and Krücken 2018).

A number of studies have pointed towards strategic behavior of academics facing new performance criteria and increased competition in Germany. One of the more studied aspects has been the strategies used around publications to ensure that the demands of the management are met. Here the discussion of quality versus quantity has been extremely poignant (Hűther and Krücken 2018). Dividing research results into the most publishable units referred as salami publishing has been observed (Butler 2003, Leišytė and Westerheijden 2014, Hűther and Krücken 2018). The quality of these publications and in general the quality of increasingly higher volumes of publications is questioned (Osterloh 2012). When the shifts in governance resulting in the pressure to perform seem to affect the quantity of publications, it is questionable what happens to the quality of publications.

6. Productivity and Professional Autonomy of Historians

To further illustrate how institutional complexity and changes in governance influence productivity and professional autonomy in a more qualitative way, we turn to the study of historians at two universities in the UK and two universities in the Netherlands (Leišytė and Hosch-Dayican 2014). The study includes document, website as well as 16 semi-structured interviews with historians carried out in 2008/09 in two different national contexts. Interviews provided the opportunity to explore the key issues surrounding the day to day practices as well as their perceptions about the effects of changes in their university for their work. In both countries, a strong and a weak department were selected based on the results of external
research evaluation results to account for different levels of productivity and quality. Moreover, the interviewees were chosen to ensure an even distribution between senior and junior academic positions.

The UK is the context of hard NPM since 1980s while the Netherlands has a softer version of NPM which was also implemented one decade later than in the UK. The experiences observed in these two contexts can be expected to provide a useful comparison to see the multi-level effects of Quasi-market logic penetrating the academic profession. Historians are especially interesting to understand the changing academic work as they usually do not fit directly the standardized performance criteria dominated by the hard sciences. They traditionally write in their native language and focus on publishing books and spend a lot of time in archives for their fieldwork. First, we explore how performance requirements affect their choices for communication channels – were to publish. Second, we observe how do these requirements affect their professional autonomy and satisfaction with work and academic profession.

6.1 Publishing Practices of Studied Historians

Institutional management rules in the case study universities in the UK and the Netherlands affect the autonomy of academics to decide about the types of publications. In both studied contexts, publishing articles in highly rated peer-reviewed journals has been emphasized by public and private funders and university managers, leading towards a practice where books (a traditional outlet for historians) are not valued as outputs to the same extent as international peer-reviewed journal articles. These new regulations put pressure on historians regarding publishing. In this specific field, books are – in addition to peer reviewed journal publications – still very important criteria to establish academic credibility. To what extent can medievalists from both countries uphold their discipline-specific publishing outlets in the face of these challenges?

In the UK, according to our interviewees, publishing articles in top academic journals is required by the university management as it is central criterion in the UK national research evaluation scheme (REF). While the studied British historians try to conform to the requirements, it is still very
important for them to publish work where colleagues will read it, value it and respond to it. Seemingly, national research evaluation routines have changed the perceptions on the hierarchy of publishers for the studied historians (e.g. certain prestigious university presses and peer-reviewed journals), which also have a certain value order based on impact factors. The mainstream medium of publishing such as textbooks does not count for the national research evaluation scheme and this goes against the way of how some of the studied historians would publish.

The guidelines from university management define the ‘appropriate’ publishing outlets. This results in university management becoming invasive about the media through which historians publish. For example, the studied historians are instructed not to publish their articles in collections but in refereed journals. More than that, they may be ‘strongly encouraged’ to publish their articles in high ranked international journals, even if the article fits better in another journal which is not included in any databases. These newly created publishing outlet hierarchies seriously influence historians’ work and change the way they produce outputs in both studied universities in the UK since the number of published monographs has decreased in both studied history departments.

Especially we can observe that the research reputation of the department matters in terms of vulnerability to these management demands. The notion of a credible output in history is changing in the weak department – and studied academics are forced to comply with this. Here the managerial demands are taken much more seriously by the interviewed academics; they feel more urge to follow the instructions for publishing strategies in order to “please the research managers” (UKwJ2). Researchers at senior levels of this department have only little freedom to choose not to comply with these requests. The new system of appraisals accounts for this tendency to a high extent:

“Appraisal occurs at two levels. With regard to research. The first is at the level of the school and the old department, where the head will see me once a year and talk to me about me research. And suggests ways in which I could produce better money or recognition for the school, the department, but I don’t have to listen. And the other way is completely new. It is just starting to be put in place now and that
is that henceforth every professor at [university], that is people with the highest academic title, like myself, will be divided into three academic levels. And at the end of every year a performance with regard to the university expectations will be reconsidered and we can be promoted or demoted according to how well they think we are doing. Now this potentially is quite a powerful mechanism for destroying our freedom to choose our topics and how we work. Because if we are considered not to be working with sufficient achievement then we get put down.” (UKwS4)

On the contrary, in the strong research department, historians generally do not report much about the research management pressure and they treat the managerial demands more as a ‘noise’. Senior researchers mostly tend to make their own research and publishing strategies; for junior researchers, journal choice is also quite topic-driven. They are also inclined to publish in good quality journals and also publish books, but they do not mention any pressure from outside to do so. But they feel the changes that the new system has brought for the academic profession. According to a junior researcher, historians’ profession has changed from being producers of research papers and books towards research management and writing grant applications to get external funding (UKsJ4). Yet the key output is still the book. Thus, the UK strong history department maintains its status through traditional outputs in the discipline.

In the Netherlands, publishing books in Dutch (and edited volumes) are highly valued outputs among historians in general, but they are also required to write articles as this is part of their performance requirements. Institutional management rules indicate the output preferences in the studied Dutch universities while at the same time, the studied senior academics have freedom to declare themselves free from management rules. Although they do publish articles themselves, they tend to ignore the rules on the quantity of outputs, and to encourage their younger colleagues and PhD students to write books. In general, there is a higher inclination towards adhering to the traditional way of publishing through books. However, it should be noted that the understanding of books being the most important form of research output is not anymore widely shared by junior academics. Publishing in journals, also in other languages than in Dutch, is becoming
common practice, since the medieval history community in the Netherlands is too small and it would not make sense to publish only for this audience (NLsJ4). This seems to be the case for both strong and weak departments.

“I am always working on Dutch history, so I am mainly publishing in Dutch journals, speaking Dutch language but also, well, outside this in German proceedings mainly but no so much in let us say English journals; no, not so much than I should be doing. At least, I think, I should be doing this more than I do. Because, well, it is for the record of course but it is also because I think these are interesting topics and they should be more broadly advertised.” (NLwj5)

So publishing in English for this junior researcher who comes from relatively weak department is internalized as a positive development to increase readability and international visibility. However, his senior colleagues seem not to agree with this and continue their traditional publishing practices concentrating on edited volumes and books in Dutch.

### 6.2 Professional Autonomy of Studied Historians

When it comes to professional autonomy, we also inquired how studied historians design their research lines and how they choose their topics of study. They note that the need to attract funding from third parties like research councils at the national and international level pushes them to collaborate with other fields, and to do research and publish on topics that do not necessarily fit into their research line. How academics approach this fact seems to vary across individuals. The studied senior historians in the UK do not feel obliged to obey the pressures from the management when it comes to research topic preferences, as they prefer to determine their topics of interest themselves and believe that it will be valued by others.

However, differences can be observed between weak and strong departments in this regard. Senior academics from the weak department feel more strain, claiming that resisting these developments is possible, but not without taking risks. In the strong department, senior academics feel less restricted by the national research evaluation requirements, they follow the topics of their choice:
“There is limited time, one obviously wants to find out as many things as one can and push the subject forward as far as one can. And so in a sense that is no different now than it was then. I am, certainly not driven myself by the requirements of the RAE or requirements of writing a letter to the Vice Chancellor. I do it because I want to do these things. That’s been the case throughout my career.” (UKsS1)

In the Netherlands, some senior researchers are not very positive about having to focus on subjects that are not really interesting to them in order to attract funding, which is important to the university management, whereas others appear enthusiastic about the opportunity to combine innovative research with more traditional fields. They think that deviating from own research topics is not necessarily an impeding factor, on the contrary, it is better this way for the sake of societal relevance. Thus, the latter do not feel that their professional autonomy is threatened.

6.3 Experiencing Pressure to Perform

As discussed above, the uniform criteria of evaluation such as high rated journals or book publishers are experienced as a drawback as well as an interference with the freedom to determine research content and publication outlets. However, pressure to perform increases also in terms of academic job profiles: professors are expected to take more of a leadership role and to fit into the template of a new role description. Certain targets should be met at certain stages of academic careers, studied historians must conform to the particular performance criteria. Otherwise they could lose their jobs or would not get a promotion, which creates a new layer of anxiety. In addition, the complex system of accountability and the resulting bureaucratic procedures and high expectations from the management to publish and attract external funding add up to the workload of the studied academics at all levels.

The interviews with the Dutch medievalists indicate that teaching, supervision of students and administrative tasks do not leave enough time to write articles, and certainly not to write a book. These tasks take a lot of time at the disadvantage of research and writing which result in chronic reported overtime work and dissatisfaction. A Dutch professor mentions
that he spends “an average of 85 hours a week” working (RugHWR4II). Yet giving up on teaching or research is not the solution for him, since his profession as an academic goes along with a strong feeling of responsibility:

“I considered a lot of things I do as my duty to society and to my profession. And the so-called luxury situation of the 60s and the 70s and the world social relevance of what we are doing was invented in the early 70s; that situation allowed scholars either to be lazy and there were examples of that, or indeed within their working time in a relatively normal degree, to spend time on all of these things.” (NLwS4)

The solution for them to get along with the pressures in getting funding so that they can buy themselves out of teaching and administrative duties for a certain time period. Although they take up new tasks of acquiring external funding, the traditional role of being a researcher is prioritized over anything else and there is concern that the new performance monitoring measures and increased paperwork may impair their research performance, as the same professor states:

“I also think that all the paperwork that is created by all these procedures is so counterproductive so the productivity of our scholarly field would be higher if they simply […] had allowed us to do our research in a proper way that what we are appointed for. And I fiercely object the suggestion that there are lazy scholars; maybe they were in the 60s but the paradise of the 60s and the early 70s already has vanished by the end of the 80s, and we are all aware of our duties, and people work very hard, and zealously and in fact they devote too much of their social life to their profession because they simply love their profession and do not want to make their research suffer from the comebacks and the increase of duties in the field of teaching, but that, certainly over the last 6 years, is clearly noticeable.” (NLwS4)

Junior academics feel less pressure from the management although they are also expected to teach, do research and attract external funds. They do not think that the organizational change has led towards work intensification. This may be related to them taking this multiplicity of roles as given as they have been already socialized already into this managerial regime. One junior historian from the Netherlands reports that high performance is a part of the job:
“I do not feel pressured into doing anything; it is a positive choice. […] I know of other people who have felt very pressured to do things that they really did not like doing but in my case, that is not so. I mean I love my job – let me be very clear about that. I also love the performance part of that. I mean I enjoy giving papers and I enjoy answering questions and you know doing the usual stuff that comes your way.” (NLsJ4)

The reported limited pressure among junior academics may be related to the socialized norm and accepted fact that working overtime and writing publications in the ‘free time’ are already accepted as a part of the normal work portfolio of an academic, especially by the new generation of studied historians. A Dutch post-doc states that “there is always a lot to do, too many things to do, but that is also because as I said I am always publishing about other things as well. So you can also skip that and then, well, it would be much easier and more quiet.” (NLwJ5) Yet since they are strongly attached to their researcher identities and are strongly geared to produce academic publications, they prefer to invest extra time on writing as they perceive it also crucial for their career development. Exiting the academic system is not a preferable scenario for the studied junior academics, they see themselves dedicated to the academic profession.

Overall, the output demands created by management rules have different implications for the studied historians. In the UK, where the higher education system is more managerial and characterized by stricter hierarchies, complex accountability structures and harder sanctions for under-performance in research, academics tend to conform to the new rules more strongly, in fear of sanctions. And this development leads to concerns about the future role and identities of academics among the interviewed UK historians:

“So key themes have emerged as being… the extent to which… globalization is leading to isomorphism to all universities being the same… The role of a global university in its local context. And I think above all […] the role and identity of academics in a global system of higher education. And I think we are concerned about, by saying identity and role of academics, and what say they have had in policy making. So those are some of the key issues.” (UKwJ2)

On the contrary, Dutch medievalists tend to perceive the new regulations
more as “incentives” rather than “sticks”. Still, the new management rules and performance monitoring indicators are seen as overstated. Also, the adverse effects of quantification of performance indicators have been mentioned. In order to guarantee accountability, the management sanctions the ‘low’ number of publications by taking away research time and vice versa, which is a measure that is questioned by the studied academics. Some of them state that they are motivated to be accountable to taxpayers, but in their view the national and university performance evaluation criteria hinder academic work. A senior academic summarizes his observations as follows:

“I am fortunately in a period of my career that I simply can say what the heck, I do what I want, I stand for what I do. But younger colleagues, they suffer from these rules, and these are examples of what has grown wrong I think in this tendency which, in general, is a good tendency that not only politicians but also the scholarly world itself wants to make the best use of the money the taxpayer makes available to us. So we want to control, we want to stimulate productivity but it has turned into an over-expressed control and that has increased over the years I think.” (NLwS4)

In sum, compared to their British colleagues, Dutch academics experience less stress and anxiety. Being an academic is still professionally satisfying in spite of all pressures created by the changing management rules and increasing workloads. According to them, academic work is still “hard work but still one of the best jobs in the world” as put by the senior academic in the well performing history department in the Netherlands (NLs.J2). Thus, the ability to keep the protected spaces among the studied historians depends on the seniority as well as research credibility of the department- as well as the national context. This points to the importance of the institutional complexity found in the two national contexts where the UK historians are stronger affected which leads to their conformity to the performance pressures especially among the junior academics and in the weaker departments (see Table 1):
Table 1  Protected Spaces Regarding Publications and Topic Choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic work</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>NL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Output</td>
<td>· Shift towards journal publications</td>
<td>· Shift among junior researchers (tend to publish more in journals and in English)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Maintaining books as primary outlet in the strong department and among senior researchers (protected space)</td>
<td>· Strong maintenance of Dutch books as primary outlet in both departments (protected space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic Choice</td>
<td>· Maintenance of topics of own preference only possible among strong departments and senior researchers (limited protected space)</td>
<td>· Both boundary crossing and maintenance, no pattern observed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

7. Conclusion

As we have shown Quasi-market and Academic logics are playing out in different ways across European higher education systems. The NPM reforms have been fostered by the governments to provide more ‘institutional’ autonomy to universities while at the same time, to curtail the power of academic oligarchy. The examples provided have shown that the Humboldtian type of systems like Germany followed the softer NPM approach compared to the UK. In the case of North Rhine-Westphalia we observe that Quasi-market logic has not yet become a dominant logic to guide governance arrangements despite a range of changes that have taken place in the formal governance arrangements, such as increase in competition and accountability to the state, retreat of direct ministerial control and strengthening of external stakeholders and managers. At the same time, in practice the university bureaucracy expands but the consensus based decision-making culture is retained. Academic collegiality remains important and chairs in practice retain their professional autonomy in teaching and research and are part and parcel of the key decisions regarding academic content. Thus even though shifts in governance towards NPM
have taken place, we cannot ascertain that Quasi-market logic has become dominant in the German higher education context.

However, looking at academic practices in different European countries we see a varied picture. When it comes to the productivity measures, German academics are producing an increased number of publications compared to other big industrialised nations and have increased the patent filing as well. The UK has also increased its publication and patent filing numbers, although to a lesser extent. At the same time, in Germany the numbers of academic staff have significantly increased due to third party funded projects, while in the UK – slightly decreased, which points that productivity pressures seem to be stronger in the UK.

The example of historians from the UK and the Netherlands has also qualitatively indicated that the pressure to perform is experienced in both countries, but in the UK the consequences are quite severe for those departments that are underperforming as research lines may be compromised and protected spaces are more difficult to maintain. One of the issues related to such performance pressures is the change in motivations for academics from intrinsic to extrinsic (Hüther and Krücken 2018). It is argued that academics no longer may be pursuing the ‘truth for the truth sake’, but for example apply for external funding to pursue a particular research project just for the funding sake and to ‘tick the box’ in the performance matrix to get higher salary and build credibility rather than pursue an interesting and innovative research line (Schimank 2010). Another side effect for academic profession and indeed science is the resulting risk-averseness in grant applications to ensure the acquisition of external competitive third-party funds (Leišytė 2007). The long-term result of this is possible inability to pursue innovative lines of research due to the Matthew effect – those who have funding and are successful staying within ‘safe’ research lines continue to get more funding, while those who chose for more risky lines are likely to lose the competition. Although studies have shown the strategic behavior of academics designing risky projects on the side as well as creating protecting spaces and manipulating the university bureaucracy to attract resources (Leišytė et al. 2010, Teelken 2012) – only some academics, usually the elites and more seniors can achieve this. Continuous staying
within the mainstream can potentially erode academic ethos and what constitutes science (Hüther and Krücken 2018). Thus, some NPM reforms may come at the cost of reducing professional autonomy. For some disciplines this may change what counts as an output and what knowledge is produced.

This calls for rethinking of how the governance arrangements are implemented in practice and how to balance out the possibly conflicting Quasi-market and Academic logics. Rebuilding trust in academics seems to be one of the key imperatives on the one hand, while on the other hand – having senior management as role models who create a shared vision of the university with the open culture for dialogue and learning celebrating bottom-up initiatives of change seems to be crucial for productive university transformation. It is clear that the status quo cannot be maintained given the increased student numbers and increasing costs of higher education. At the same time, professional autonomy and creativity driven by intrinsic motivation in protected spaces from work overloads, stress and anxiety have to be nourished if we are to aim to contribute to the societies of producing reflective graduates and offering research results that move the science frontier forward as well as contribute to our societies in a positive way. Here the notion of transformative governance is useful as it allows for this dialogue and co-creation. Bottom-up agency combined with top-down leadership where the complexity of logics is tolerated seems to allow for transformative governance and thus is important for the future of universities and academic profession (Leišytė and Wilkesmann 2016).
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制度ロジックと大学ガバナンス
－学術生産性と専門職の自律性への示唆－

リドヴィカ・ライシト

＜要 旨＞

本稿は欧州における大学ガバナンスの変容とそれが教育研究活動へ与える影響について、研究の生産性と専門職の自律性に着目して考察する。特に、制度ロジック（Thornton and Ocasio 2008）とガバナンス等化モデル（De Boer et al. 2007）という2つの理論的枠組みを用いることで、NPM型の大学改革が極度の管理主義をもたらすと同時に、ドイツなどのフンボルト型大学では同僚制支配も未だに影響力を保持していることを論じる。また、公益や普遍性を重視した科学研究者のマートン的価値観を基本とするアカデミアの論理が、高等教育からの私的な経済的価値を基本とする市場の論理によって脅かされていることを論じる。本稿の分析の要点は、以下の通りである。第1に、NPM型の高等教育改革の最中にあっても、論文数などの古典的な研究生産性指標は向上している。ただし、その背後で専門職の自律性を犠牲にするというコストを負っている可能性がある。たとえば、ドイツ、フランス、イギリスでは、論文数と特許数は2008年から2015年の間、着実に増加してきた。同時に、教員の労働時間も増加しており、それは主に管理的業務の増加によるものであった。また、機関による外部資金獲得圧力は、教員を更に研究課題や短期的の研究課題に向けさせることになった。第2に、このような状況下では、自分たちの研究を正当に評価するための戦略が重要であるが（Rip 2011）、それが可能なのは一部の専門分野や一部のスターシュタフのみで、若手教員や歴史学など人文系分野では非常に困難である。すなわち、市場の論理が持ち込まれた大学では、何を成果としてカウントするか、何が新たな知として生み出されたかの見方が揺らぐことになり、このことは長期的に大学教授職の魅力を損なうことにつながる恐れがある。

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